All posts by Steve Tinnelly

AB-1738 (Boerner Horvath) Building standards: installation of electric vehicle charging stations: existing buildings.

Would require multifamily communities to install EV charging stations and infrastructure in the common areas during certain retrofit projects.

Current Status: Chaptered

FindHOALaw Quick Summary:

The California Building Standards Law establishes the California Building Standards Commission within the Department of General Services. Existing law requires the commission to approve and adopt building standards and to codify those standards in the California Building Standards Code.
Existing law also requires the Department of Housing and Community Development to propose to the commission for consideration mandatory building standards for the installation of future electric vehicle charging infrastructure for parking spaces in multifamily dwellings. Existing law requires the commission to adopt, approve, codify, and publish mandatory building standards for the installation of electric vehicle charging infrastructure for parking spaces in multifamily dwellings and nonresidential development.
This bill would add and repeal Health & Safety Code 18941.11 to require the commission and the Department of Housing and Community Development, by the intervening edition of the Building Standards Code effective July 1, 2024, to research, develop, and propose for mandatory building standards for the installation of electric vehicle charging stations with low power level 2 or higher electric vehicle chargers, including direct current fast chargers,  in existing multifamily dwellings during retrofits to existing buildings that are issued permits on and after the effective date of those building standards.
Finally, this bill would require the Department of Housing and Community Development and the commission to review those building standards every triennial code cycle and update those building standards until specified goals are met.  The bill would repeal these provisions on January 1, 2033.
**AB-1738 was signed in to law on September 28, 2022 and take effect January 1, 2023.
View more info on AB 1738
from the California Legislature's website

Related Links

Governor Signs Bill Prohibiting HOAs from Unreasonably Restricting EV Charging Stations - Published on HOA Lawyer Blog (July 2011) Electric Vehicle Charging Stations in Your Community? - Published on HOA Lawyer Blog (November 2011) New Legislation: SB 880 – EV Charging Stations (Round 2) - Published on HOA Lawyer Blog (March 2012) SB 1016 Signed! New Law Expands Rights to Use EV Charging Stations in HOAs - Published on HOA Lawyer Blog (September 2018)

Brown v. Montage at Mission Hills, Inc.

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 124

[Rent Restrictions; Short-term Rentals] A restriction on short-term rentals is a “prohibition” within the meaning of Civil Code section 4740 and is enforceable only against owners who purchased properties after the restriction was in effect.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County, Super. Ct. No. PSC1801783, Kira L. Klatchko, Judge. Reversed.

Slovak Baron Empey Murphy & Pinkney, Shaun M. Murphy and David A. Smith for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fiore, Racobs & Powers and Julie R. Balbini for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

RAPHAEL, J.

An individual bought a condominium, which she consistently rented for short terms. Sixteen years after her purchase, the owner’s association amended its governing documents to prohibit renting properties for less than 30 days. We agree with the owner that she was exempt from this prohibition under Civil Code section 4740, subdivision (a) (section 4740). That provision provides that an owner of a property in a common interest development “shall not be subject to a provision in a governing document or an amendment to a governing document that prohibits the rental or leasing of” the owner’s property unless that document or amendment “was effective prior to the date the owner acquired title” to the property. The trial court held that she was not exempt, so we reverse.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant and respondent Montage at Mission Hills, Inc. is a common interest development (CID) located in Cathedral City.[1] Plaintiff and appellant Nancie Brown purchased and acquired title to a property in Montage in 2002. At the time, Montage’s CC&Rs—Montage’s governing documents—did not prohibit any form of renting. Although the governing documents imposed some recordkeeping requirements for rentals, they did not ban short-term rentals (STRs) or require rentals to be for a minimum duration. This was important to Brown because she planned to use the property as an investment rental property and expected to be able to rent it for any length of time.

Brown consistently rented the property for short terms (that is, less than 30 days) from 2002 until the fall of 2017. In January 2018, Montage amended its governing documents to prohibit its members, including Brown, from renting or leasing their properties for periods shorter than 30 days. Montage notified Brown that it would enforce the new prohibition against STRs if she continued to rent her property for short terms.

Brown thereafter sued Montage, seeking declaratory relief among other claims, all of which turned on her assertion that she is exempt from Montage’s prohibition against STRs under section 4740. Brown sought summary adjudication on her declaratory relief claim, requesting that the trial court declare that section 4740 exempts her from the prohibition.

Montage responded with a motion for summary judgment. It argued that Brown’s claims failed because (1) section 4740 precludes CIDs from imposing complete bans on renting, but Montage’s prohibition on STRs is only a restriction on renting, and (2) Brown’s use of her property for STRs violated the governing documents’ prohibition on using the property for commercial purposes.

The trial court sided with Montage, finding that section 4740 does not apply because Montage’s governing documents do not “prohibit the rental or leasing” of Brown’s property but instead only restrict its rental. Because all of Brown’s claims turn on her assertion that section 4740 exempts her from the prohibition on STRs in Montage’s governing documents, the trial court granted Montage’s motion for summary judgment and denied Brown’s motion for summary adjudication. Brown timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

Section 4740, subdivision (a) states that an owner of a property in a CID shall not be subject to a provision in its regulations “that prohibits the rental or leasing of any of the separate interests in that common interest development” unless that provision “was effective prior to the date the owner acquired title to their separate interest.” The sole issue in this appeal is whether section 4740 exempts Brown from the restriction on rentals added to Montage’s governing documents after she had acquired title to her condominium. We conclude that it does.

Because this case comes to us on an appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment (to Montage) and denial of a motion for summary adjudication (to Brown) that turn on the same issue, we review the matter de novo based on facts that are undisputed. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463; Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 806, 817 fn. 3.)

When Brown purchased her property in 2002, Montage’s governing documents did not preclude her from renting her property for short terms. Now, however, the governing documents would prohibit her from doing so. The question in this appeal is whether Montage’s amendments to its governing documents in 2018 prohibiting STRs constitute “amendment[s] to a governing document that prohibit[] the rental” of Brown’s property under section 4740. If so, section 4740 exempts Brown from the amendments because she acquired title before they took effect.

We must interpret a statute to effectuate the law’s purpose. (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254, 260.) To do so, we first look to the usual and ordinary meaning of the statute’s words. (Ibid.) If the ordinary meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous, “the statute’s plain meaning controls.” (Ibid.)

With regard to STRs, the plain meaning of section 4740 is not clear and unambiguous. On the one hand, if a regulation forbids any category of rental, such as a short-term lease, that regulation “prohibits” that type of rental, even if it does not prohibit all rentals. On the other hand, the section’s language could be read to bar only complete “prohibitions” on leasing but not “restrictions” on leasing that fall short of outright bans on all leasing. A treatise Montage cites accordingly reads it as “address[ing] only `prohibitions’ on leasing, not `restrictions’ on leasing. To the extent leasing is not totally prohibited, it is unclear what rental restrictions a [CID] might adopt and enforce retroactively.” (Sproul, Howell & Rosenberry, Advising California Common Interest Communities (CEB 2017), § 6.49.) Another treatise identified the same ambiguity: “The express language of [section] 4740, which uses the wording `prohibition,’ raises the question about `restrictions’ or `limitations’ on rentals as distinguished from `prohibitions’ against rentals. The question is: `When does a restriction become a prohibition,’ or `when is a restriction not a prohibition’?” (Cal. Common Interest Developments Law & Prac. (2020 ed.) § 22:15.) These treatises both (a) conclude that there are some “restrictions” on leasing that are not “prohibitions” and (b) note that it is unclear what makes a regulation a restriction rather than a prohibition.

The parties dispute how to deal with these questions. Montage argues that its ban on STRs is a “restriction” on the rental of Brown’s property, not a “prohibition.” On the other hand, Brown argues that Montage “prohibits the rental” of her property because it prohibits her from renting her property for terms of less than 30 days. We do not think this dispute can be resolved by contemplating the text alone. Because both interpretations of section 4740 are plausible constructions of its plain language, the text of the statute is ambiguous as it relates to STRs. (See Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 508, 519 [statute is ambiguous if it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation”].)

Montage suggests that any ambiguity as to whether section 4740 allows “limitations” and “restrictions” on rentals as opposed to “outright prohibitions” can be resolved by reference to other provisions of the Davis-Sterling Act. Montage notes that other statutes in the Davis-Sterling Act provide that CIDs cannot “limit or prohibit . . . the display of the flag of the United States” (Civ. Code, § 4705, subd.), “may not prohibit posting or displaying of noncommercial signs, posters, flags, or banners” and may not “effectively prohibit[] or unreasonably restrict[]” various things within a CID. (E.g., Civ. Code, §§ 4745, subd. (a) 4745.1, 4750, 4754, subd. (c).) In Montage’s view, the waythat other Sterling-Davis Act statutes use the terms “limit” and “restrict” in addition to the term “prohibit” means that “prohibits” in section 4740 does not encompass “limitations” or “restrictions” on “the rental or leasing” of CID properties, but rather contemplates only complete bans on “the rental or leasing” of CID properties. Thus, Montage argues bans on STRs are permissible under section 4740 because they are a “limitation” or “restriction” on the rental of CID properties.

Although we may consider other provisions in “the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part” to interpret an ambiguous statutory provision, we may consider “a variety of extrinsic aids, including . . . the legislative history.” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 997.) In doing so, we must “choose the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature’s apparent intent.” (Smith v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 88.) We do not think the other Davis-Stirling provisions clearly settle the matter of interpreting the text of section 4740 because they also leave interpretive issues about what they prohibit and restrict. For the reasons explained below, we conclude the Legislature’s intent underlying section 4740 is best articulated in the statute’s legislative history. We therefore reject Montage’s argument that we need not consider section 4740’s legislative history, and we turn to that history to aid in determining the statute’s meaning. (Uber Technologies Pricing Cases (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 963, 973.)

That history indicates that the Legislature intended broad protection for owners against restrictions on renting, including the sort of restriction at issue in this case. When enacting section 4740, the Senate’s originating committee recognized that “[s]ome CIDs have restrictions on renting out units,” such as “requiring a minimum amount of time for leases.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 25, 2011.) Section 4740 was proposed to “respond to those restrictions.” The corresponding Assembly committee stated that section 4740 was necessary because “only express legislative language will protect an owner’s right to lease his or her property from leasing restrictions that may be adopted by CID members subsequent to purchase.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2011.) In these reports, then, the committees not only used the word “restrictions” (rather than “prohibitions”) but also made at least one reference to minimum-time restrictions.

Further, the legislative history indicates that the Legislature’s intention was to ensure that owners maintained all the rental and leasing rights they had at the time of purchase. By enacting section 4740, the Legislature sought to “preserv[e] the CID’s right to adopt leasing restrictions, while at the same time ensuring that the owner can only be so limited if the restrictions were in place at the time the interest was acquired.” The Legislature thus intended section 4740 to ensure that “[i]f members of a [homeowners association] vote to pass a restriction on rentals the restriction would not apply to an owner that had the right to rent or lease when they purchased unless they agree to waive that right.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2011.)

Put another way, in enacting section 4740, the Legislature “declare[d] that the rights of CID owners to rent or lease their properties, as the rights existed at the time they acquired them, should be protected.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 25, 2011.) That is, the Legislature passed the statute to “[p]rovide[] that the right of an owner to rent or lease his or her separate interest [in a CID] shall be the same as when the owner purchased his or her separate interest throughout the life of ownership.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2011.)

In both its language and its substance, then, section 4740’s legislative history shows that the Legislature sought for it to broadly address both rental “restrictions” and rental “prohibitions” in CIDs. In our view, the statute’s legislative history demonstrates that the statute’s goal is to exempt CID property owners from any kind of rental prohibition or restriction that did not exist when the owner acquired title to the property. The exemption must include at least the type of restriction at issue here, where a category of rentals (STRs) is barred. We do not address whether an association could enact a generally applicable limitation on occupants (such as a noise restriction) or impose certain generally applicable requirements (such as a fee for using a common facility, or housekeeping rules) that affect renting but do not directly prohibit “the rental or leasing” of the property itself. That is, we need not decide whether a CID association may pass generally applicable rules that may negatively affect a CID property owner’s ability to rent or lease her property yet do not “prohibit” its renting or leasing. We need not deal with that question in this case, where the regulation bars all STRs. That is a prohibition on renting or leasing, not a prohibition on something else that happens to affect it.

We note that the Legislative Counsel, whose opinions we must “give due deference” (Grupe Development Co. v. Superior Court (1993) 4 Cal.4th 911, 922), reached the same conclusion. In its opinion, “the legislative history [of section 4740] demonstrates that the Legislature sought to address both rental restrictions and outright prohibitions,” and that the statute’s purpose “was to exempt [CID property] owners from any rental prohibition, regardless of its nature, that took effect on or after January 1, 2012, unless the prohibition took effect before the owner acquired title.”

The Legislative Counsel thus summarized its opinion about section 4740’s effect on rental prohibitions in CIDs, including prohibitions on STRs, as follows: “[U]nder Civil Code section 4740, an owner of a separate interest in a [CID] is subject to a provision of a governing document or an amendment to a governing document that became effective on or after January 1, 2012, and that prohibits an owner from renting out the owner’s interest in the property under certain conditions, such as a short-term lease, only if either (1) the prohibition took effect before the owner acquired title to his or her separate interest in that development, or (2) the owner consented to the governing document or amendment containing that provision.” (Italics added.) Given section 4740’s legislative history, we agree.

In briefing, Montage dismisses section 4740’s legislative history as “irrelevant”—an assertion we reject—and offers the following three arguments why Brown is not exempt from its ban on STRs.

Montage first argues an STR is a “limited license” to use the property, and thus Brown’s guests who rent her property on a short-term basis are licensees, not “tenants” who rent the property under section 4740. Montage failed to preserve this line of argument for consideration on appeal. (See Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1216-1217.)[2]

Regardless, we reject the argument. In analogous contexts, courts have routinely used the term “rent” and its variants to refer to short-term occupancies. (See City of San Bernardino Hotel/Motel Assn. v. City of San Bernardino (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 237, 246 [“The ordinance defines `rent’ as `the consideration charged, whether or not received for the occupancy of space in a hotel . . . .'”]; Batt v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 163, 167 [“[T]he Hotel Tax imposes a levy of 14 percent `on the rent for every occupancy of a guest room in a hotel in the City and County.'”]; In re Transient Occupancy Tax Cases (2016) 2 Cal.5th 131, 135 [discussing ordinance that defined “rent” as “`the total consideration charged to a Transient'”].) The same conclusion is supported by the common, dictionary definition of the terms: The rental of a property is “a usually fixed periodical return made by a tenant or occupant of property to the owner for the possession and use thereof.” (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rent, italics added.) A STR is a “rental” under section 4740, even if it could be described as a “license” as well.

Montage next argues that Brown is effectively running a hotel out of her property. Montage thus contends Brown’s use of her property for STRs violates regulations in the governing documents added in 2018 that allow her to use her property for “residential” use only and prohibit her from using it for “business or commercial activities.” This argument is curious in that a lease exceeding 30 days also is a “business or commercial” activity in the sense that Montage is construing that phrase, particularly when that lease is for profit. Because the association does not purport to ban renting or leasing in general, the prohibition on business or commercial activity must refer to operating a business at the property, not renting or leasing the property itself. Indeed, the governing documents’ prohibition is for such activities “in” any residence or “on” any portion of the property. We cannot see how the prohibition on “business or commercial” activity can be read to prohibit short term rentals but not longer term ones. Regardless, as we explained above, section 4740 exempts Brown from any regulation, whatever its label, that restricts her rights to rent her property if the regulation did not exist at the time she acquired title to the property and she does not agree to the regulation. Montage’s prohibition on “business or commercial” activities, if interpreted the way Montage does as a prohibition on STRs, is another such regulation that would contravene section 4740.[3]

Montage nonetheless argues its STR prohibition is permissible due to “public policy considerations.” Montage observes that individual property owner’s rights must sometimes give way to the public interest and the right of CIDs to decide their rules and restrictions. We must give effect, however, to the public policy considerations that were given priority by the Legislature when it adopted section 4740. (See Palmer v. Agee (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 377, 384 [statutory interpretation that “will promote legislative intent, purpose and policy will override a construction that would defeat it”].) Section 4740 was enacted to protect “the rights of CID owners to rent or lease their properties, as the rights existed at the time they acquired them.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 25, 2011.) (Italics added.) Its goal is to ensure that “the right of an owner to rent or lease his or her separate interest [in a CID] shall be the same as when the owner purchased his or her separate interest throughout the life of ownership.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 150 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2011.) Our task is to ensure that goal is met. (Palmer v. Agee, supra, at p. 384; Bernard v. City of Oakland (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1553, 1560-1561.)

Finally, we note that the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 4741 while this appeal was pending. That statute provides, among other things, that a CID may “adopt[] and enforce[] a provision in a governing document that prohibits transient or short-term rental of a separate property interest for a period of 30 days or less.” (Civ. Code, § 4741, subd. (c).) But Civil Code section 4741 also provides that, “[i]n accordance with [s]ection 4740, [Civil Code section 4741] does not change the right of an owner of a separate interest who acquired title to their separate interest before the effective date of this section to rent or lease their property.” (Civ. Code, § 4741, subd. (h).) Even recently, the Legislature sought to protect the short-term rental rights of CID property owners who took title to their properties before sections 4740 and 4741 went into effect, much like section 4740’s general protection for the rental rights of owners who took title before a change to rental prohibitions in governing documents, even though in section 4741 the Legislature permitted CIDs to regulate STRs going forward.

Because Montage’s prohibition on STRs did not exist when Brown acquired title to her property, she is exempt from the prohibition under section 4740. We therefore reverse the trial court’s orders granting Montage’s motion for summary judgment and denying Brown’s motion for summary adjudication.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment granted to Montage is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new order denying Montage’s motion for summary judgment and granting Brown’s motion for summary adjudication. Brown is awarded costs on appeal.

MILLER, Acting P. J. and MENETREZ, J., concurs.

[1] The Davis-Sterling Act defines a common interest development as including a community apartment project, a condominium project, a planned development, or a stock cooperative. (Civ. Code, § 4100.) Any of these is managed by an association that is called either an owner’s association or a community association. (Civ. Code, § 4800.) An association’s governing document is called a “Declaration” (Civ. Code, § 4250), or more fully a “Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,” which is commonly called the association’s “CC&Rs.” (See generally Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association (1994) 8 Cal.4th 361, 369.)

[2] Montage’s one-line argument on the issue made in its summary judgment reply brief without any supporting authority or analysis is insufficient to preserve the argument on appeal. (See Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 437.)

[3] We do not address whether Montage and other CIDs can enforce a new generally applicable prohibition on operating a business at the property, even if that new rule burdens renters. That issue is not presented here however because Brown uses her property only for STRs.

Davis-stirling Act

Civil Code Section 5216. Safe at Home Program Participants.

(a) Notwithstanding any other law, upon request of a member of an association who is an active participant in the Safe at Home program, the association shall do both of the following:

(1) Accept and use the address designated by the Secretary of State as the Safe at Home participant’s substitute address under the Safe at Home program for all association communications.

(2) Withhold or redact information that would reveal the name, community property address, or email address of the Safe at Home participant from both of the following:

(A) All resident community membership lists, including mailbox bank listings, resident directories, electronic keypads, unit property numbers, and internet web portal accounts.

(B) Any membership list that will be shared with other members of the association.

(b) An association shall keep member participation in the Safe at Home program confidential.

(c) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Community property address” means the address of the member’s property within the community governed by the association.

(2) “Safe at Home participant” means a person certified as a program participant in the Safe at Home program.

(3) “Safe at Home program” means the address confidentiality program established pursuant to Chapter 3.1 (commencing with Section 6205) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

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Board Meetings During Government Emergency

Civil Code Section 5450
Section 5450 was added to the Civil Code to address situations when physically gathering at a board meeting is unsafe or impossible because the HOA is in an area affected by one or more of the following conditions:

  • A state of disaster or emergency declared by the federal government.
  • A state of emergency proclaimed by the Governor under Section 8625 of the Government Code.
  • A local emergency proclaimed by a local governing body or official under Section 8630 of the Government Code

Teleconference Meeting without Physical Location
Conducting a teleconference board meeting generally requires “at least one director or person designated by the board” to be present at the physical location designated in the notice of the teleconference meeting. (Civ. Code § 4090(b).)  However, this physical location requirement does not apply to board meetings held under Section 5450 during government emergencies, provided that all Section 5450 meeting requirements (discussed below) are satisfied. (Civ. Code § 5450(b).)

Civil Code Section 5450 Meeting Requirements

  • Notice of the first board meeting conducted under Section 5450 for a particular emergency must be delivered to all members by individual delivery. (Civ. Code § 5450(b)(1).)
  • Notice for each meeting conducted under Section 5450 must include, in addition to other required content for meeting notices, all of the following: (Civ. Code § 5450(b)(2).)
    • Clear technical instructions on how to participate by teleconference;
    • The telephone number and email address of a person who can provide technical assistance with the teleconference process, both before and during the meeting; and
    • A reminder that a member may request individual delivery of meeting notices, with instructions on how to do so.
  • Every director and member has the same ability to participate in the meeting that would exist if the meeting were held in person. (Civ. Code § 5450(b)(3).)
  • Any vote of the directors must be conducted by a roll call vote. (Civ. Code § 5450(b)(4).)
  • Any person who is entitled to participate in the meeting must be given the option of participating by telephone. (Civ. Code § 5450(b)(5).)

When Mail Delivery or Retrieval is Not Possible; Email Notice
If, as a result of the disaster or emergency, mail delivery or retrieval is not possible at any onsite mailing address within the HOA, and the address on file with the HOA for that member is the same as the onsite mailing address, the HOA is required to send the notice of the first meeting referenced above to any email address provided to the HOA by that member. (Civ. Code § 5450(c).)

Davis-stirling Act

Civil Code Section 5450. Meetings During Government Emergency.

(a) This section only applies to a common interest development if gathering in person is unsafe or impossible because the common interest development is in an area affected by one or more of the following conditions:

(1) A state of disaster or emergency declared by the federal government.

(2) A state of emergency proclaimed by the Governor under Section 8625 of the Government Code.

(3) A local emergency proclaimed by a local governing body or official under Section 8630 of the Government Code.

(b) Notwithstanding any other law or the association’s governing documents, and except as provided in subdivision (d), a board meeting or meeting of the members may be conducted entirely by teleconference, without any physical location being held open for the attendance of any director or member, if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) Notice of the first meeting that is conducted under this section for a particular disaster or emergency affecting the association is delivered to members by individual delivery.

(2) The notice for each meeting conducted under this section includes, in addition to other required content for meeting notices, all of the following:

(A) Clear technical instructions on how to participate by teleconference.

(B) The telephone number and electronic mail address of a person who can provide technical assistance with the teleconference process, both before and during the meeting.

(C) A reminder that a member may request individual delivery of meeting notices, with instructions on how to do so.

(3) Every director and member has the same ability to participate in the meeting that would exist if the meeting were held in person.

(4) Any vote of the directors shall be conducted by a roll call vote.

(5) Any person who is entitled to participate in the meeting shall be given the option of participating by telephone.

(c) If, as a result of the disaster or emergency, mail delivery or retrieval is not possible at any association onsite address and the address on file with the association for that member is the same association onsite address, then the association shall send the notice of the first meeting referenced in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) to any email address provided to the association by that member, in writing, pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 4040 or subdivision (b) of Section 4041.

(d) Subdivision (b) does not apply to a meeting at which ballots are counted and tabulated pursuant to Section 5120, unless both of the following conditions are met:

(1) The meeting at which ballots are to be counted and tabulated is conducted by video conference.

(2) The camera is placed in a location such that members can witness the inspector of elections counting and tabulating the votes.

(e) The remedies available pursuant to Section 4955 shall also be available to address violations of this section.

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Civil Code Section 51.3.5. Intergenerational Housing Developments.

(a) The Legislature finds and declares that this section is essential to establish and preserve specially designed, accessible, intergenerational housing for senior citizens. There are senior citizens who need special living environments and services and benefit from intergenerational housing environments, and find that there is an inadequate supply of this type of housing in the state.

(b) An intergenerational housing development may be established to provide intergenerational housing consisting of units for senior citizens, caregivers, or transition age youths if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1)

(A) At least 80 percent of the occupied dwelling units are occupied by at least one senior citizen. This requirement shall commence when at least 25 percent of the units are occupied. A dwelling unit is occupied by at least one senior citizen if, on the date the exemption for housing designed for intergenerational housing is claimed, one of the following conditions is satisfied:

(i) At least one occupant of the dwelling unit is a senior citizen.

(ii) If the dwelling unit is temporarily vacant, at least one of the occupants immediately prior to the date on which the unit was temporarily vacated was a senior citizen.

(B) Up to 20 percent of the occupied dwelling units are occupied by at least one caregiver or transition age youth. A dwelling unit is occupied by at least one caregiver or transition age youth if, on the date the exemption for housing designed for intergenerational housing is claimed, one of the following conditions is satisfied:

(i) At least one occupant of the dwelling unit is a caregiver or transition age youth.

(ii) If the dwelling unit is temporarily vacant, at least one of the occupants immediately prior to the date on which the unit was temporarily vacant was a caregiver or transition age youth.

(2) The development is affordable to lower income households as defined in Section 50079.5 of the Health and Safety Code.

(3)

(A) If a unit that is identified for occupancy by a caregiver or transition age youth ceases to house a caregiver or transition age youth, the owner, board of directors, or other governing body may require, at their discretion, the household in that unit to cease residing in the development upon receipt of a minimum of six months written notice, for the sole purpose of ensuring that the unit may be made available to a qualifying caregiver or transition age youth. This action shall not constitute a violation of Section 51 or of Article 2 (commencing with Section 12955) of Chapter 6 of Part 2.8 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code (California Fair Employment and Housing Act).

(B) The housing facility or community shall not evict or terminate the lease of a family with children in order to comply with the requirement that at least 80 percent of the occupied units be occupied by at least one senior citizen. This provision does not otherwise alter or affect applicable protections for tenants.

(C) The covenants, conditions, and restrictions and other documents or written policy for the development shall set forth the limitations on occupancy, residency, or use consistent with this section.

(4) Housing established pursuant to this section shall comply with all applicable fair housing laws, including, but not limited to, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Part 2.8 (commencing with Section 12900) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code) and the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601).

(5) Notwithstanding any other law, any occupied dwelling units within an intergenerational housing development established pursuant to this section that are occupied by caregivers or transition age youth as described in subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) shall not count toward the housing type goal for seniors under the qualified allocation plan adopted by the California Tax Credit Allocation Committee in accordance with Section 50199.14 of the Health and Safety Code.

(c) This section specifically creates a state policy supporting intergenerational housing for senior citizens, caregivers, and transition age youth, as described in Section 42(g)(9) of the Internal Revenue Code, and, further, permits developers in receipt of local or state funds or tax credits designated for affordable rental housing to restrict occupancy to senior citizens, caregivers, and transition age youth, including permitting developers in receipt of tax credits designated for affordable rental housing to retain the right to prioritize and restrict occupancy, so long as that housing does not violate any other applicable laws.

(d) For the purposes of this section, the following terms have the following meanings:

(1) “Caregiver” means a person responsible for meeting the daily care needs of a senior citizen, or a person hired to provide live-in, long-term, or terminal health care to a qualifying resident, or a family member of the qualifying resident providing that care. For purposes of this section, the care provided shall be substantial in nature and shall include either assistance with necessary daily activities or medical treatment, or both.

(2) “Senior citizen” or “resident” means a person 55 years of age or older.

(3) “Transition age youth” means a person who is 18 to 24 years of age, inclusive, and who is either of the following:

(A) A current or former foster youth who has been adjudged a ward or dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

(B) A homeless youth or former homeless youth, who has met the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 definition of “homeless children and youths,” as that term is defined in Section 11434a of Title 42 of the United States Code.

Civil Code Section 714.3. Restrictions on Accessory Dwelling Units.

(a) Any covenant, restriction, or condition contained in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument affecting the transfer or sale of any interest in real property that either effectively prohibits or unreasonably restricts the construction or use of an accessory dwelling unit or junior accessory dwelling unit on a lot zoned for single-family residential use that meets the requirements of Section 65852.2 or 65852.22 of the Government Code is void and unenforceable.

(b) This section does not apply to provisions that impose reasonable restrictions on accessory dwelling units or junior accessory dwelling units. For purposes of this subdivision, “reasonable restrictions” means restrictions that do not unreasonably increase the cost to construct, effectively prohibit the construction of, or extinguish the ability to otherwise construct, an accessory dwelling unit or junior accessory dwelling unit consistent with the provisions of Section 65852.2 or 65852.22 of the Government Code.

Davis-stirling Act

Civil Code Section 5103. Board Elections by Acclamation.

Notwithstanding the secret balloting requirement in Section 5100, or any contrary provision in the governing documents, when, as of the deadline for submitting nominations provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 5115, the number of qualified candidates is not more than the number of vacancies to be elected, as determined by the inspector or inspectors of the elections, the association may, but is not required to, consider the qualified candidates elected by acclamation if all of the following conditions have been met:

(a) The association has held a regular election for the directors in the last three years. The three-year time period shall be calculated from the date ballots were due in the last full election to the start of voting for the proposed election.

(b) The association provided individual notice of the election and the procedure for nominating candidates as follows:

(1) Initial notice at least 90 days before the deadline for submitting nominations provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 5115. The initial notice shall include all of the following:

(A) The number of board positions that will be filled at the election.

(B) The deadline for submitting nominations.

(C) The manner in which nominations can be submitted.

(D) A statement informing members that if, at the close of the time period for making nominations, there are the same number or fewer qualified candidates as there are board positions to be filled, then the board of directors may, after voting to do so, seat the qualified candidates by acclamation without balloting.

(2) A reminder notice between 7 and 30 days before the deadline for submitting nominations provided for in subdivision (a) of Section 5115. The reminder notice shall include all of the following:

(A) The number of board positions that will be filled at the election.

(B) The deadline for submitting nominations.

(C) The manner in which nominations can be submitted.

(D) A list of the names of all of the qualified candidates to fill the board positions as of the date of the reminder notice.

(E) A statement reminding members that if, at the close of the time period for making nominations, there are the same number or fewer qualified candidates as there are board positions to be filled, then the board of directors may, after voting to do so, seat the qualified candidates by acclamation without balloting. This statement is not required if, at the time the reminder notice will be delivered, the number of qualified candidates already exceeds the number of board positions to be filled.

(c)

(1) The association provides, within seven business days of receiving a nomination, a written or electronic communication acknowledging the nomination to the member who submitted the nomination.

(2) The association provides, within seven business days of receiving a nomination, a written or electronic communication to the nominee, indicating either of the following:

(A) The nominee is a qualified candidate for the board of directors.

(B) The nominee is not a qualified candidate for the board of directors, the basis for the disqualification, and the procedure, which shall comply with Article 2 (commencing with Section 5900) of Chapter 10, by which the nominee may appeal the disqualification.

(3) The association may combine the written or electronic communication described in paragraphs (1) and (2) into a single written or electronic communication if the nominee and the nominator are the same person.

(d)

(1) The association permits all candidates to run if nominated, except for nominees disqualified for running as allowed or required pursuant to subdivisions (b) to (e), inclusive, of Section 5105.

(2) If an association disqualifies a nominee pursuant to this subdivision, an association in its election rules shall also require a director to comply with the same requirements.

(e) The association board votes to consider the qualified candidates elected by acclamation at a meeting pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 4900) for which the agenda item reflects the name of each qualified candidate that will be seated by acclamation if the item is approved.

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AB 502 Signed! Board Elections by Acclamation Available to all California HOAs –Published on HOA Lawyer Blog (October 2021)

Health & Safety Code Section 1597.41. Restrictions on Family Day Care Homes.

(a) Every provision in a written instrument relating to real property that purports to restrict the conveyance, encumbrance, leasing, or mortgaging of the real property for use or occupancy as a family daycare home is void, and every restriction in that written instrument as to the use or occupancy of the property as a family daycare home is void.

(b) An attempt to deny, restrict, or encumber the conveyance, leasing, or mortgaging of real property for use or occupancy as a family daycare home is void. A restriction related to the use or occupancy of the property as a family daycare home is void. A property owner or manager shall not refuse to sell or rent, or refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a detached single-family dwelling, a townhouse, a dwelling unit within a dwelling, or a dwelling unit within a covered multifamily dwelling in which the underlying zoning allows for residential use to a person because that person is a family daycare provider.

(c) Except as provided in subdivision (d), a restriction, whether by way of covenant, contract, condition upon use or occupancy, or by transfer of title to real property, that restricts directly or indirectly limits the acquisition, use, or occupancy of a detached single-family dwelling, a townhouse, a dwelling unit within a dwelling, or a dwelling unit within a covered multifamily dwelling in which the underlying zoning allows for residential use as a family daycare home is void.

(d)

(1) A prospective family daycare home provider who resides in a rental property shall provide 30 days’ written notice to the landlord or owner of the rental property prior to the commencement of operation of the family daycare home.

(2) A family daycare home provider who has relocated an existing licensed family daycare home program to a rental property on or after January 1, 1997, may provide less than 30 days’ written notice when the department approves the operation of the new location of the family daycare home in less than 30 days, or the home is licensed in less than 30 days, so that service to the children served in the former location not be interrupted.

(3) A family daycare home provider in operation on rental or leased property as of January 1, 1997, shall notify the landlord or property owner in writing at the time of the annual license fee renewal, or by March 31, 1997, whichever occurs later.

(4) Notwithstanding any other law, upon commencement of, or knowledge of, the operation of a family daycare home on an individual’s property, the landlord or property owner may require the family daycare home provider to pay an increased security deposit for operation of the family daycare home. The increase in deposit may be required notwithstanding that a lesser amount is required of tenants who do not operate family daycare homes. The total security deposit charged shall not exceed the maximum allowable under existing law.

(5) Section 1596.890 shall not apply to this subdivision.

(e) During the license application process for a small or large family daycare home, the department shall notify the applicant that the remedies and procedures in Article 2 (commencing with Section 12980) of Chapter 7 of Part 2.8 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code relating to fair housing are available to family daycare home providers, family daycare home provider applicants, and individuals who claim that any of the protections provided by this section or Section 1597.40, 1597.42, 1597.43, 1597.45, 1597.45 or 1597.46 have been denied.

(f) For the purpose of this section, “restriction” means a restriction imposed orally, in writing, or by conduct and includes prohibition.

(g) This section does not alter the existing rights of landlords and tenants with respect to addressing and resolving issues related to noise, lease violations, nuisances, or conflicts between landlords and tenants.

SB-10 (Wiener) Planning and zoning: housing development: density.

Would allow for high density housing (up to 10 units) on a single parcel within a planned development.

Current Status: Chaptered

FindHOALaw Quick Summary:

Existing law makes void and unenforceable any covenant, restriction, or condition contained in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument affecting the transfer or sale of any interest in a planned development, and any provision of a governing document, that effectively prohibits or unreasonably restricts the construction or use of an accessory dwelling unit or junior accessory dwelling unit on a lot zoned for single-family residential use that meets specified standards.
This bill would add Civil Code Section 4752 to make void and unenforceable any covenant, restriction, or condition contained in any deed, contract, security instrument, or other instrument affecting the transfer or sale of any interest in a planned development, and any provision of a governing document, that effectively prohibits or unreasonably restricts a use or density authorized by an ordinance adopted pursuant to Government Code Section 65913.5. The bill would provide that it does not apply to provisions that impose reasonable restrictions that do not make the implementation of an above-described ordinance infeasible.
** SB 10 was amended on June 24, 2021, to remove changes to the Davis-Stirling Act.

**UPDATE:  SB 10 was signed by the Governor on September 16, 2021.  Its changes to the law take effect January 1, 2022.

View more info on SB 10
from the California Legislature's website

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