Steve Tinnelly, Author at FindHOALaw

(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 205

[Director Inspection Rights; Limited in Extreme Cases; A director’s absolute record inspection rights may be limited only in extreme cases where inspection would produce an absurd result.

Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli for Defendant and Appellant.
Tisdale & Nicholson and Michael D. Stein for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

KRAUSE, J.—

This is an action to compel an inspection of books and records pursuant to Corporations Code section 1600 et seq.^[1] Plaintiff Rick Fowler (Fowler) sought a writ of mandate against defendant Golden Pacific Bancorp, Inc. (Bancorp), to enforce his statutory rights as a director and majority shareholder to inspect corporate books and records. Bancorp opposed the petition, arguing that the trial court should curtail Fowler’s inspection rights because he is involved in ongoing litigation with Bancorp and could use the information to undermine Bancorp’s position in the lawsuit. Unpersuaded that Bancorp met the heavy burden necessary to curtail Fowler’s inspection rights, the trial court granted Fowler’s writ petition.

Bancorp appealed, contending that the trial court erred by (1) allowing Fowler to submit additional evidence on reply without permitting Bancorp an adequate opportunity to respond; and (2) granting the writ petition and permitting Fowler to have unfettered access to Bancorp’s corporate books and records.

After we issued an oral argument waiver notice, Bancorp moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. Bancorp asserted that due to the recent acquisition of [211] Bancorp by Social Finance, Inc., Fowler is no longer a Bancorp board member, and therefore it is impossible for this court to grant effective relief. Fowler requested oral argument. We deferred ruling on the motion until after oral argument.

We shall conclude that the primary issue raised in this appeal is moot because Fowler is no longer a member of Bancorp’s board of directors and therefore has no director’s inspection rights. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits because it presents an issue of substantial and continuing public interest: whether a director’s “absolute” right of inspection under section 1602 may be curtailed because the director and corporation are involved in litigation and there is a possibility the documents could be used to harm the corporation.

We shall conclude the mere possibility that information could be used adversely to the corporation is not by itself sufficient to defeat a director’s inspection rights. Rather, any exception to the general rule favoring unfettered access must be limited to extreme cases, where enforcing an “absolute” right of inspection would produce an absurd result, such as when the evidence establishes the director’s clear intent to use the information to breach fiduciary duties or otherwise commit a tort against the corporation.

We decline to reach the other question referenced in the parties’ briefs concerning Fowler’s inspection rights as a shareholder, because that issue was not resolved by the trial court and the record is insufficiently developed for us to determine whether it is moot. Thus, we shall remand this matter for the trial court to consider whether that issue is moot and, if not, to resolve any remaining disputes in the first instance.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bancorp was a bank holding company conducting business through its wholly owned subsidiary, Golden Pacific Bank, N.A. Fowler was a member of Bancorp’s board of directors and its largest individual shareholder, holding over 19 percent of the outstanding stock. Fowler also is the chief operating officer of a law firm, Kronick, Moskovitz, Tiedemann & Girard (KMTG).

In July 2018, Bancorp filed a lawsuit in the Sacramento County Superior Court (Golden Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Kronick, Moskovich, Tiedemann & Girard (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, No. 34-2018-00236905)) against KMTG, an individual attorney at KMTG, and Fowler (the malpractice lawsuit). The lawsuit arose out of KMTG’s representation of Bancorp in prior litigation against a company called BillFloat, Inc. (the BillFloat litigation). Bancorp’s amended complaint alleges claims against KMTG and its attorney [212] for breach of contract, breach of professional duties, professional negligence, and breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the prosecution and eventual settlement of the BillFloat litigation. Among other things, the complaint alleges that KMTG and the attorney overbilled for services, negligently failed to evaluate and prepare the case for trial, and caused Bancorp to accept a grossly inadequate settlement amount.

The complaint also alleges claims against Fowler for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, concealment, and fraud based on his actions as a Bancorp director. Specifically, it asserts that Fowler breached his fiduciary duties by persuading Bancorp to hire KMTG for the BillFloat litigation despite knowing that KMTG was not competent to handle the litigation. It further alleges that Fowler used his position as director to persuade Bancorp to settle the BillFloat litigation for a grossly inadequate amount because Fowler knew KMTG had failed to conduct sufficient discovery and investigation to prepare the case for trial.

In September 2018, two months after Bancorp filed the malpractice lawsuit, Fowler delivered to Bancorp a written demand to inspect and copy the following books and records pursuant to section 1600 et seq.:

A list of the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, and holdings of all Bancorp shareholders;
A breakdown of the expense and income balance sheet items labeled “Other” for Bancorp and its wholly owned subsidiary bank;
A breakdown of where on the 2017 and 2018 consolidated financial statements the BillFloat settlement payment was booked, and where KMTG’s legal fees for 2016, 2017, and 2018 were booked;
Any change in control/severance/golden parachute agreements for Bancorp-affiliated parties;
Any resolutions approving change in control agreements or an increase in director fees and/or bonuses for 2016, 2017, and 2018;
Any documents evidencing payment of the personal legal fees of Bancorp president and chief executive officer, Virginia Varela, in 2016, 2017, and 2018;
The loan file pertaining to the Axis Energy SBA loan; and
The bank’s accounting books and records, and meeting minutes for its board and committees from September 2017 through the date of the request.

[213] Fowler asserted that, as a director, he had an “absolute right” to inspect the records under section 1602. Bancorp, however, refused to permit inspection, citing conflicts of interest and concerns that Fowler was seeking the records for an improper purpose, namely, to undermine Bancorp’s position in the malpractice lawsuit.

Fowler did not immediately seek a peremptory writ to enforce his statutory inspection right. Instead, in November 2018, Fowler served Bancorp with a request for production of documents in the malpractice lawsuit seeking records substantially similar to those sought in his inspection demand letter.

When Bancorp refused to produce the requested documents, Fowler filed a motion to compel. In support of his motion, Fowler argued that the requested documents were relevant to Bancorp’s claims and his defenses in the malpractice lawsuit. Bancorp opposed the motion, asserting, inter alia, that most of the records Fowler requested were irrelevant to the lawsuit and would only be of interest in his capacity as a “disgruntled shareholder/director.” The court agreed with Bancorp. It denied the motion to compel, concluding that the document requests were overbroad, invaded third party privacy rights, and sought information that was not relevant.

Shortly thereafter, Fowler filed this action for a peremptory writ of mandate to enforce his statutory right to inspect Bancorp’s books and records. His amended petition alleges that he has an “absolute right” as a director and shareholder to inspect and copy the records pursuant to sections 1600 and 1602. In a supporting declaration, Fowler stated that he requested the inspection to protect his interests as Bancorp’s single largest shareholder and to fulfill his fiduciary duty as a director to stay informed about Bancorp’s financial condition and operations.

Bancorp opposed the writ petition, asserting that inspection should be denied because Fowler is not a disinterested director and his only motive in requesting the records is to “dismantle and undermine” Bancorp’s lawsuit against him and the law firm for which he works. Bancorp characterized the petition as an attempted “end-run” around the adverse discovery ruling in the malpractice lawsuit.

To support its claim that Fowler was requesting the documents for an improper purpose, Bancorp submitted a declaration from Bancorp board member David Roche.^[2] Roche declared, inter alia, that (1) Fowler is a party to ongoing litigation with Bancorp in which it is alleged Fowler breached his [214] fiduciary duties; (2) Fowler repeatedly stated his desire to have the litigation dismissed; (3) Bancorp’s board believes that allowing Fowler to inspect and copy the requested records would “severely undermine” its position in the litigation; (4) Fowler previously sought to compel discovery of the same records in the lawsuit, but his request was denied; (5) it was only after the adverse discovery ruling that Fowler filed the writ petition; and (6) Fowler never previously made a demand to inspect Bancorp’s corporate records.

In reply, Fowler filed a supplemental declaration responding to the factual assertions made in Bancorp’s opposition papers. Fowler declared, “Contrary to [Bancorp’s] supposition about my purpose in filing the Petition, I want to inspect the subject corporate records, especially the financial statements and working papers for these records, among other things, to learn how certain expenses and income items were calculated and what certain large numbers consist of, as well as how the compensation for [Bancorp’s] Chief Executive Officer and its directors is being determined and the basis for and calculations of certain stock transactions with [Bancorp’s] preferred shareholder.”

In his supplemental declaration, Fowler also addressed why he never previously invoked his statutory right to inspect Bancorp’s corporate records. He explained that before July 2017, he regularly received reports, had frequent exchanges with the chief executive officer and committee chairs, and had unrestricted access to most corporate documents through an online platform. It was only when Bancorp “cut off” his ability to contact employees and access corporate records online that it became necessary for him to invoke his statutory inspection rights.

The writ petition was heard on March 6, 2019. On the morning of the hearing, Bancorp filed a declaration of Virginia Varela, Bancorp’s president and chief executive officer, which sought to refute various statements in Fowler’s supplemental declaration, including his assertions that (1) he previously had online access to the records discussed in his September 2018 demand; and (2) he was wrongfully denied access to the basic financial information necessary for him to carry out his duties as a board member. The court agreed to consider the Varela declaration to the extent it responded to the factual assertions in Fowler’s supplemental declaration, but refused to consider any new grounds for denying inspection.

After a hearing, the trial court granted the writ petition. In its ruling, the court agreed with Bancorp that Fowler’s statutory inspection rights are not “absolute.” However, the court ruled that a director’s inspection rights can be curtailed only in “`extreme circumstances'” in which the corporation establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the director’s intent to commit an [215] irremediable tort against the corporation. The court ruled that, notwithstanding the inherent conflict raised by the malpractice lawsuit, “[t]he preponderance of the evidence in this action does not establish Fowler’s intent to commit a tort against [Bancorp], much less one that is irremediable in damages.” The court thus enforced Fowler’s right to inspect the corporate books and records under section 1602.

Judgment was entered on March 17, 2020. Bancorp filed a timely notice of appeal.

While the appeal was pending, Bancorp was acquired by Social Finance, Inc. (SoFi), by and through a merger with Gemini Merger Sub, Inc. (Gemini), a temporary subsidiary of SoFi formed solely for that purpose. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Gemini was merged into Bancorp, with Bancorp as the surviving corporation. Further, under the agreement, the directors of Gemini became the directors of the surviving corporation. SoFi completed the acquisition of Bancorp on or about February 2, 2022.

DISCUSSION

Mootness

As a threshold issue, we consider whether the appeal is moot due to SoFi’s acquisition of Bancorp.

An appeal becomes moot when the occurrence of an event makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant any effective relief. (Newsom v. Superior Court (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1109 [278 Cal.Rptr.3d 397].) “`[A]n action which originally was based upon a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if the questions raised therein have become moot by subsequent acts or events.'” (Id. at p. 1110.)

Bancorp argues that this appeal is moot and must be dismissed because, as a result of the acquisition, Fowler is no longer a shareholder or member of Bancorp’s board of directors, and therefore no longer has standing to assert any inspection rights.

Fowler opposes Bancorp’s motion to dismiss. He argues the case is not moot for several reasons, including that he filed a “dissenter’s right” lawsuit challenging SoFi’s acquisition of Bancorp and seeking a determination of the fair market value of his shares. Further, even if the case has been rendered [216] technically moot, Fowler argues the appeal still should be decided because it concerns an issue of public importance that is likely to recur.

We agree with Bancorp that the issue of Fowler’s inspection rights as a director is now moot. It is well established that a director’s right to inspect corporate books and records ends upon his or her removal from office. (Chantiles v. Lake Forrest II Master Homeowners Assn. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 914, 920 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] (Chantiles).) A former director has no right to an ongoing and enforceable right to inspect corporate records. (Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 903, 919 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 850] (Wolf).) Here, it is undisputed that, as a result of SoFi’s acquisition, Fowler is no longer a Bancorp director. Thus, Fowler can no longer assert rights as a director to inspect Bancorp’s books and records, rendering the issue moot. (Chantiles, supra, at p. 920; Wolf, supra, at p. 919.)

Nevertheless, we may exercise our discretion to retain and decide an issue which is technically moot where the issue is of substantial and continuing public interest. (Chantiles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 921; accord, La Jolla Cove Motel & Hotel Apartments, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 773, 781-782 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 467].) We do so here. The scope of a director’s inspection rights is one of public importance which we should decide, even if it is technically moot.

We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding Fowler’s claim to shareholder inspection rights under section 1600, subdivision (a). This issue was not resolved by the trial court and the additional facts before us are inadequate for us to determine whether subsequent events have rendered the issue moot. Accordingly, we shall remand this matter for the trial court to consider whether subsequent events have rendered this issue moot and, if not, to resolve any remaining disputes in the first instance.

Bancorp’s Request for Additional Briefing

Turning to the merits, we first address Bancorp’s argument that the trial court erred by allowing Fowler to provide additional evidence in his reply papers while denying Bancorp a fair opportunity to respond.

As described above, in reply to Bancorp’s opposition, Fowler submitted a supplemental declaration giving his reasons for demanding an inspection and explaining why he had not made similar demands in the past. Bancorp objected to the additional evidence and, in the alternative, requested additional time to file a sur-reply brief addressing Fowler’s new evidence. The court overruled Bancorp’s objections and denied its request to file a sur-reply brief.

[217] We review the trial court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion (Alliant Ins. Services, Inc. v. Gaddy (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1299 [72 Cal.Rptr.3d 259]), and find no abuse here. As the trial court held, “Although Fowler is the petitioner in this proceeding, it was not his initial burden to provide reasons for the inspection.” Unlike director inspection rights in other states, “[t]he California statutory scheme does not impose a `proper purpose’ requirement….” (Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analytical Services, Inc. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1844, 1851 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 696] (Havlicek); cf. Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 220.) Thus, Fowler was not required in his moving papers to articulate a proper purpose for the inspection reasonably related to his interests as a director. He merely needed to show that he was a director and that he made a demand for inspection, which was refused. (§§ 1602, 1603.)

When Fowler made that showing, the burden shifted to Bancorp to show why the inspection should be curtailed by “just and proper conditions.” (§ 1603; Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1856; see Saline v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 909, 915 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 813] (Saline).) In attempting to meet that burden, Bancorp presented evidence to show that Fowler was seeking the documents for an improper purpose. The trial court correctly ruled that Fowler was entitled to respond with countervailing evidence in his reply.

Bancorp argues that because the court allowed Fowler to refute the evidence presented in the opposition, the court was obliged to give Bancorp the same opportunity. But Bancorp was given an opportunity to refute the additional evidence presented in the reply. On the morning of the hearing, Bancorp filed the Varela declaration to “refute many of the misstatements and omissions” in Fowler’s supplemental declaration. The court considered that declaration to the extent it responded to the factual assertions in the supplemental declaration. The record shows that Bancorp had a fair opportunity to respond. Bancorp has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow it additional time to file a sur-reply, much less that it was prejudiced by the refusal.

III

Fowler’s Right To Inspect Corporate Records

Bancorp next argues that the trial court erred in granting the petition to enforce Fowler’s right to inspect corporate books and records under section 1602. We disagree.

[218] A. The scope of a director’s inspection rights

In reviewing the trial court’s judgment granting a petition for writ of mandate, we apply the substantial evidence test to the trial court’s factual findings. (Vasquez v. Happy Valley Union School Dist. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 969, 980 [72 Cal.Rptr.3d 15].) Legal issues, such as statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. (Ibid.) The scope of a director’s right to inspect corporate documents is a question of law subject to de novo review. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)

In construing section 1602, as with any statute, our task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165 [158 Cal.Rptr.3d 639, 302 P.3d 1026].) We begin “with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804].) If the language contains no ambiguity, we generally presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning controls. (Garcetti v. Superior Court (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 [102 Cal.Rptr.2d 703].)

Section 1602, which governs the right of inspection, provides in relevant part: “Every director shall have the absolute right at any reasonable time to inspect and copy all books, records and documents of every kind and to inspect the physical properties of the corporation of which such person is a director and also of its subsidiary corporations, domestic or foreign.” (§ 1602.) By its plain terms, section 1602 establishes a broad right of inspection. (Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1852.) The Legislature’s choice of the word “absolute” suggests a right “having no restriction, exception, or qualification.” (Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dict. Online (2022) [as of June 23, 2022], archived at .) This “absolute” right reflects a legislative judgment that directors are better able to discharge their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders “if they have free access to information concerning the corporation.” (Havlicek, at p. 1852; see Hartman v. Hollingsworth (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 579, 581-582 [63 Cal.Rptr. 563].)

Nevertheless, decisional authority establishes that a director’s right to inspect documents is subject to exceptions. (Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1855.) While the “absolute right” to inspect documents is the general rule in California, courts have held that the literal meaning of the words of the statute may be disregarded where necessary to avoid absurd results. (Havlicek, at p. 1856; see also Anderson Union High School Dist. v. Shasta Secondary Home School (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 262, 279 [208 Cal.Rptr.3d 564] [219] [the language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences].) Thus, a trial court may impose “just and proper conditions” upon a director’s inspection rights in appropriate cases. (§ 1603, subd. (a);^[3] Havlicek, at p. 1856; see Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.)

The full scope of exceptions to a director’s “absolute” inspection rights remains unsettled. But our colleagues in other appellate districts have identified certain circumstances in which inspection rights may be curtailed.

In Chantiles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 914, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the “absolute” right of a homeowners association director to access records may be limited to preserve the constitutional rights of members to keep their voting decisions private. (Id. at pp. 918, 926.) In Chantiles, a director who believed that he had been shortchanged in the tabulation of proxy votes, filed a petition to inspect and copy all the ballots cast in the association’s annual election. (Id. at p. 919.) But the trial court refused to permit the director unfettered access to the ballots. Instead, the court established a procedure whereby the director’s attorney could inspect the ballots while preserving the secrecy of how each individual member voted. (Id. at pp. 920, 926.) The appellate court affirmed. It held that the trial court had properly balanced the competing interests and determined that the director’s statutory right to an unqualified inspection must yield to the members’ constitutional right of privacy. (Id. at pp. 925-926; but see conc. opn. of Crosby, J., at pp. 927-929 [concluding damages, rather than a rejection of inspection rights, is the appropriate remedy for misapplication of corporate records].)

In Havlicek, the Second Appellate District, Division Six, considered whether the trial court properly denied inspection of corporate books and records by two dissident directors who were opposed to a corporation’s pending merger. (Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1848-1850.) The directors asserted an absolute right to inspect the records, but the corporation refused to permit access because it suspected the directors might use the documents to establish a competing business. (Id. at pp. 1849-1850.) The directors filed a lawsuit to enforce their inspection rights, which the trial court denied. (Id. at p. 1850.) The appellate court reversed and remanded. (Id. at [220] pp. 1856-1857.) It concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to grant the directors, “at the very least, an `inspection with just and proper conditions.'” (Id. at p. 1848.)

For guidance on remand, the court explained that because the right of inspection arises out of a director’s fiduciary duty—a duty to act with honesty, loyalty, and good faith in the best interests of the corporation (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1037 [100 Cal.Rptr.3d 875])—courts may limit inspection rights when a director intends to misuse those rights to harm the corporation. (Havlicek, supra, at pp. 1852, 1855-1856.) The court offered the following hypothetical to illustrate the point: “A disgruntled director unambiguously announces his or her intention to violate his or her fiduciary duties to the corporation and the shareholders by using inspection rights to learn trade secrets, gain access to confidential customer lists, and compete with the corporation. In this situation, does the Legislature want the judiciary to come to the aid of the disgruntled director, enforce the `absolute right’ to inspect and help the director commit a tort against the corporation? No.” (Id. at pp. 1855-1856.) Thus, the court concluded, when the evidence shows an unfettered inspection will result in a tort against the corporation, the trial court may “exercise its broad discretion under section 1603, subdivision (a) to fashion a protective order imposing just and proper conditions on the inspection.” (Id. at p. 1856.)

In Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 909, the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, followed Havlicek in concluding that a court may place restrictions on a director’s access to corporate records when there is evidence the director intends to use the documents to commit a tort against the corporation. (Saline, at p. 914.) However, the court clarified that this principle should “only be applied in extreme circumstances where a preponderance of the evidence establishes the director’s clear intent to use the documents to commit an egregious tort—one that cannot be easily remedied by subsequent monetary damages—against the corporation.” (Id. at p. 915.)

The Saline court refused to limit the inspection rights of a director despite evidence that the director had a conflict of interest, breached fiduciary duties, breached a confidentiality agreement, and publicly defamed management, because there was no evidence to show the director intended to use the documents obtained to “disclose trade secrets, compete with or otherwise harm” the corporation.^[4] (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 912, 914.) The court reasoned: “Only the issues related to the prevention of a tort resulting from [the director’s] inspection of the documents—not the entirety of his [221] conduct as a director—are relevant to the question of whether limiting [his] access to corporate documents was appropriate.” (Id. at p. 914.) Without evidence that the director intended to use the documents to commit a tort against the corporation, the court held it was improper to limit the director’s access. (Id. at pp. 914-915.)

In Tritek Telecom, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1385 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 455] (Tritek), a different division of the Fourth District (Division One) considered a related question: whether a director’s right to inspect corporate records should include attorney-client communications generated in defense of the director’s own suit for damages against the corporation. (Id. at p. 1387.) The court decided it should not. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.) In that case, a disgruntled director sought to enforce his inspection rights after suing the corporation to vindicate his individual rights as a shareholder. (Id. at pp. 1387-1388.) The corporation did not dispute the director’s right to inspect corporate documents generally, but objected that the right of inspection should not include documents protected by the attorney-client privilege. (Id. at p. 1391.) The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding that a director’s inspection rights may be restricted when the director intends to misuse those rights to access privileged documents that were generated in defense of a suit for damages that the director filed against the corporation. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.)

Here, in ruling on Fowler’s petition, the trial court followed Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 909, and concluded that a director’s right to inspect corporate records generally may be curtailed only in “extreme circumstances” in which the corporation establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the director’s intent to use the information to commit a tort against the corporation that cannot easily be remedied in a damages action. The trial court rejected Bancorp’s claim that the mere fact Fowler was involved in litigation with the corporation should defeat his inspection rights.

Bancorp argues that the trial court interpreted the scope of a director’s inspection rights too broadly. Bancorp argues that a court may deny access to corporate records whenever the director has a conflict of interest and there is a mere possibility the documents could be used to harm the corporation. We disagree.

Like the trial court, we conclude that exceptions to the general rule favoring unfettered access should only be applied in “extreme” cases where enforcing the “absolute” right of inspection would otherwise produce an absurd result. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 915; Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1856.) We reach this conclusion for several reasons.

[222] California has adopted a strong public policy favoring a broad right of access to assist directors in performing their duties in an intelligent and fully informed manner. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 914; see also Chantiles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 (conc. opn. of Crosby, J.).) The statutory scheme gives “`[e]very director … the absolute right … to inspect and copy all books, records and documents of every kind,'” and imposes no “`proper purpose'” requirement. (Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1851; see § 1602.) Because the denial of access to corporate records may operate to deny a director the ability meaningfully to participate in management, any exception to the policy of “absolute” access must be construed narrowly, limited to the most extreme cases where applying the literal meaning of the words would frustrate the manifest purpose of the law. (Havlicek, at pp. 1855-1856; see also Anderson Union High School Dist. v. Shasta Secondary Home School, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 279 [absurdity exception should be used only in extreme cases].)

Second, to construe the exception broadly would risk allowing the exception to swallow the rule. Differences of opinion invariably will arise among corporate directors. If a minority director can lose access to corporate records merely because the director is deemed hostile or adverse to management, the exception could remove the very protections that the “absolute right” of inspection was intended to supply. This invariably would impede inspections pursued for indisputably proper purposes, such as ascertaining the condition of corporate affairs or investigating possible mismanagement. (See, e.g., Henshaw v. American Cement Corp. (Del.Ch. 1969) 252 A.2d 125, 129.)

Third, applying the exception narrowly does not generally leave the corporation unprotected. If a director abuses a right of inspection to the detriment of the corporation, the corporation normally will have an adequate remedy in the form of an action against the director for breach of fiduciary duty. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 916; Chantiles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 (conc. opn. of Crosby, J.).)

We therefore agree with the Court of Appeal in Saline that the mere possibility that the information could be used to harm the corporation is not sufficient to defeat a director’s otherwise “absolute” inspection rights. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.) While inspection rights may be curtailed when the corporation adduces evidence that a director intends to use those rights to violate his or her fiduciary duties or otherwise commit a tort against the corporation, we are not persuaded that a director’s right of inspection must be denied solely because the director has a conflict of interest or is embroiled in litigation with the corporation. Allowing a director to inspect records under such circumstances does not necessarily lead to an absurd result. To conclude otherwise would defeat the purpose of section 1602.

[223] The cases on which Bancorp relies, Wolf, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th 903, and Tritek, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 1385, are easily distinguishable. Wolf involved an inspection demand by a plaintiff who formerly served as a director of the defendant corporation. (Wolf, at pp. 906-907, 919.) Because the plaintiff was no longer a director, the appellate court held that the plaintiff did not have standing to enforce any inspection rights.^[5] (Wolf, at p. 919.) The language in Wolf stating that the plaintiff’s threat to sue the corporation “severely undermined” his inspection rights was unsupported dictum, which we find neither compelling nor persuasive. (Ibid.)

Bancorp similarly points to a statement in Tritek suggesting that a court may limit a director’s inspection rights whenever “the director’s loyalties are divided and documents obtained by a director in his or her capacity as a director could be used to advance the director’s personal interest in obtaining damages against the corporation.” (Tritek, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1391.) But Bancorp’s argument takes this language out of context and ignores the holding of the case, which is that a director does not have the right to access privileged documents generated in defense of a suit for damages that the director filed against the corporation. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.) In such a scenario, the director’s intent to misuse the information to harm the corporation is self-evident. Therefore, consistent with the holdings in Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pages 1855-1856, and Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pages 914-915, it was proper to limit the director’s inspection rights to exclude the privileged documents. There has been no similar showing here—that Fowler is seeking access to documents protected by the attorney-client privilege. Thus, Tritek‘s holding simply does not apply under the facts of this case.

Bancorp also argues the trial court interpreted Fowler’s inspection rights too broadly by requiring Bancorp to show Fowler intended to use the information to commit “irremediable” harm. It contends that a threatened “irremediable” tort against the corporation is merely an “example of when a director’s inspection may be curtailed,” and not a requirement to curtail a director’s inspection rights. Bancorp argues the court should have asked only whether Fowler intended to use the information to harm the corporation.

We find it unnecessary to reach this issue because the trial court expressly found that the “preponderance of the evidence in this action does not establish Fowler’s intent to commit a tort against [Bancorp,] much less one [224] that is irremediable in damages.” Thus, even under a more lenient standard, Bancorp failed to carry its burden.

In sum, this is not a case in which the director’s right to inspect corporate records was alleged to conflict with constitutional or other statutory protections, as in Chantiles, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th 914. Nor is it a case involving access to privileged documents generated in defense of a suit for damages that the director filed against the corporation, as in Tritek, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th 1385. The only accusation in this case was that Fowler intended to breach his fiduciary duties in some fashion by using the records sought adversely to the corporation in the malpractice lawsuit. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly considered whether Bancorp showed by a preponderance of the evidence that a protective order was necessary to prevent Fowler from breaching his fiduciary duties or otherwise committing a tort against the corporation. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 915; Havlicek, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1856.)

Sufficiency of the evidence for the trial court’s ruling

We next consider the trial court’s finding that Bancorp failed to make a sufficient evidentiary showing to justify restrictions in this case. This presents a question of fact. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 913; Hall v. Regents of University of California (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1586 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 387]; Hartman v. Bandini Petroleum Co. (1930) 107 Cal.App. 659, 661 [290 P. 900].)

Bancorp argues that it submitted significant evidence demonstrating Fowler intended to harm the corporation by using the documents to undermine the claims against him in the malpractice litigation. The trial court disagreed, finding that Bancorp failed to carry its burden. Although the court acknowledged the divergence of interests between Fowler and Bancorp with respect to the malpractice lawsuit,^[6] the court was not persuaded that Fowler’s inspection was motivated by an improper purpose or that he intended to breach fiduciary duties or otherwise commit a tort against the corporation.

It is not our function on appeal to reexamine whether a preponderance of the evidence supports Bancorp’s position. We are bound by the fundamental appellate rule that the judgment of the lower court is presumed [225] correct and that all intendments and presumptions will be indulged in favor of its correctness. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133 [275 Cal.Rptr. 797, 800 P.2d 1227].) The appellant has the burden to overcome that presumption and show reversible error. (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 610 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 256].) Where, as here, the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof, the question for a reviewing court is whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law, i.e., whether the evidence was “`”of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.”‘” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 301]; accord, Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 769 [201 Cal.Rptr.3d 268].) Bancorp falls well short of that standard.

In opposing the petition, Bancorp relied primarily on evidence that Fowler (1) previously breached his fiduciary duties in connection with the BillFloat litigation; and (2) unsuccessfully sought to obtain the same corporate records as part of his discovery in the malpractice lawsuit. The first category of “evidence,” consisting largely of unsupported allegations, had little persuasive value on the question whether Fowler was likely to use the requested corporate records to breach his fiduciary duties or otherwise commit a tort against the corporation. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 914 [only the director’s likely use of the information is relevant, not the entirety of his or her conduct as a director].)

As to the second category of evidence, Bancorp argues that it proved Fowler’s intent to harm the corporation by using the information to undermine Bancorp’s lawsuit. The trial court, however, found otherwise. It credited Fowler’s declarations that the purpose of the inspection was related to his continuing duties as a member of Bancorp’s board of directors. “[W]e must defer to the trial court’s determinations of credibility.” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 498 [204 Cal.Rptr.3d 1].)

Moreover, even if we were to find that Fowler had an ulterior motive, Bancorp argued, and the trial court in the malpractice lawsuit agreed in its discovery ruling, that the documents Fowler sought were irrelevant to the litigation. Thus, regardless of Fowler’s motives, there is no support for Bancorp’s vague assertion that allowing Fowler access to the records would “severely undermine” its position in the lawsuit. (See Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 357 [260 Cal.Rptr.3d 1] [doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits a party from asserting a position that is contrary to a position successfully asserted in the same or some earlier proceeding].)

[226] On this record, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding Bancorp’s evidence insufficient to curtail Fowler’s “absolute” right to inspect corporate records.

DISPOSITION

Bancorp’s request for judicial notice is granted. Bancorp’s motion to dismiss is denied. The judgment is reversed as moot. This reversal does not imply that the judgment was erroneous on the merits, but is solely for the purpose of returning jurisdiction over the case to the trial court by vacating the otherwise final judgment solely on the ground of mootness. On remand, the trial court is directed to dismiss Fowler’s claim to a director’s right of inspection under section 1602 as moot. The trial court is directed to consider whether Fowler’s claim to a shareholder’s right of inspection under section 1600, subdivision (a) is also moot and, if not, to resolve any remaining disputes between the parties relating to that issue. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

Robie, Acting P. J., and Hull, J., concurred.

[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the Corporations Code.

[2] The trial court sustained evidentiary objections to the Roche declaration. The rulings on those objections are not challenged in this appeal.

[3] Section 1603, subdivision (a) provides, in part: “Upon refusal of a lawful demand for inspection, the superior court of the proper county, may enforce the right of inspection with just and proper conditions or may, for good cause shown, appoint one or more competent inspectors or accountants to audit the books and records kept in this state and investigate the property, funds and affairs of any domestic corporation or any foreign corporation keeping records in this state … and to report thereon in such manner as the court may direct.”

[4] The trial court’s order refused the director access to documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and the director did not challenge that condition. (Saline, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 912-913.)

[5] In the course of explaining the plaintiff’s lack of standing, the court in Wolf suggested that a director’s inspection rights may be denied if the director is not “disinterested.” (Wolf, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 919.) We find this language to be erroneous dictum to the extent it suggests a director’s inspection rights may be denied based merely on the existence of a conflict of interest or adversarial relationship between the director and the corporation.

[6] We grant Bancorp’s request to take judicial notice that on September 21, 2021, Fowler filed a lawsuit against Bancorp challenging the proposed SoFi merger/acquisition, but we take notice of it only for purposes of the mootness claim, and not for purposes of judging the sufficiency of the evidence. (California School Bds. Assn. v. State of California (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 770, 803 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 696]; Duronslet v. Kamps (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 717, 737 [137 Cal.Rptr.3d 756].)

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1043

[Attorney’s Fees; Prevailing Party] Nether party achieved litigation objective to warrant the status as the prevailing party entitled to its attorneys’ fees.

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant Kazuko Artus: Millstein & Associates, David J. Millstein, San Francisco, Owais Bari;
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant Gramercy Towers Condominium Association: Angius & Terry LLP, Cang N. Le, Riverside, Joshua D. Mendelsohn, Westlake Village; Tinnelly Law Group, Cang N. Le, Riverside, Joshua D. Mendelsohn, Westlake Village.

OPINION

Richman, Acting P. J.

*1 A condominium owner sued her homeowners’ association alleging five causes of action, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as to election and voting rules and sale and leasing guidelines. One cause of action fell to a demurrer, another to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, and the parties stipulated that the last three were mooted when the association amended its rules and guidelines. Both sides moved for attorney fees as the prevailing party under the Davis-Sterling Act (Civ. Code, § 4000 et seq.); the homeowner also sought fees as the successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. Following lengthy hearings, the trial court denied attorney fees to both sides, in a comprehensive and thoughtful order. Both sides appeal. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The General Setting

Gramercy Towers is a residential condominium development in San Francisco. It is managed by Gramercy Towers Condominium Association (GTCA or the Association), a non-profit mutual benefit corporation founded under the Davis-Sterling Common Interest Development Act (Davis-Sterling Act), at Civil Code section 4000 et seq. Management of GTCA is centralized in a seven-member board of directors, which retains or employs non-board and non-member agents and employees, including a general manager.

The governing documents of the GTCA consist of: (a) First Restated Articles of Incorporation filed March 20, 2008, as amended in 2010; (b) First Restated Bylaws executed March 11, 2008, and various Amendments; and (c) Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions executed February 29, 2008. GTCA also has operating rules and guidelines adopted by the board of directors.

Kazuko K. Artus, Ph.D., J.D., (Dr. Artus), owned three units at Gramercy Towers, and as such is a member of the GTCA. Over the years Dr. Artus has had various disputes with GTCA, which generated three prior lawsuits by her, one of which led to a published opinion by Division One of this court affirming a ruling by the San Francisco Superior Court that denied Dr. Artus injunctive and declaratory relief and her claim to attorney fees: Artus v. Gramercy Towers Condominium Association (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 923, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 496 ( Artus I).

The Lawsuit Here

On October 10, 2017, Dr. Artus filed a complaint against GTCA, followed soon thereafter by the operative first amended complaint. It alleged five causes of action, styled as follows: “(1) Injunctive Relief and Appointment of Monitor; (2) Injunctive Relief Against Enforcement of the ‘Restated Election and Voting Rules’; (3) Injunctive Relief Against Enforcement of the ‘Sale and Leasing Guidelines’; (4) Declaratory Relief Against Enforcement of the ‘Restated Election and Voting Rules’ Adopted November 22, 2016; and (5) Breach of Contract and Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.”

In late December, Dr. Artus sought a preliminary injunction. Following numerous pleadings, on January 23, 2018, the Honorable Harold Kahn granted it, preliminarily enjoining GTCA from enforcing the alternative election rules during the pendency of the lawsuit. As will be seen, it was Judge Kahn, a most experienced Superior Court judge, who presided over the case through its conclusion—a vigorously contested case, it must be noted, that generated a 32-page register of actions.

*2 In response to the complaint, GTCA had filed a demurrer and a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP). Dr. Artus filed oppositions, GTCA replies and the matters came on for hearing on March 15. On March 27, Judge Kahn entered his order, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to the first cause of action; granting the anti-SLAPP motion as to the fifth cause of action; and overruling the demurrer as to the second, third, and fourth causes of action. With only the three causes of action remaining, the case was limited to the election rules and the rules for listing condominium units for sale, narrowing significantly the focus of the litigation. As Dr. Artus would later acknowledge, “My counsel and I chose not to appeal the March 27 and 28 orders [demurrer and anti-SLAPP ruling], and thereby to narrow the scope of the instant litigation.”

GTCA Amends the Rules and Moves for Summary Judgment

In 2018, the GTCA revoked the 2016 Alternative Election Rules, and in their place adopted Restated and Amended Election Rules (2018 Election Rules). At the same time the board rescinded the Sale and Leasing Guidelines that had been in place (usually referred to as the Alotte Guidelines) and adopted a new set of “Sale and Leasing Guidelines.”

GTCA brought a motion for summary judgment/adjudication on grounds that, the earlier election rules and guidelines having been rescinded, there was no longer a controversy upon which effective relief could be granted to Dr. Artus, that the case was moot. And on August 6, 2019, Dr. Artus and GTCA stipulated that the remaining causes of action were moot.

The Motions for Attorney Fees

Civil Code section 5975, subdivision (c), part of the Davis-Sterling Act, provides as follows: “In an action to enforce governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” And the Declaration to the Act provides as follows: “12.12 COSTS AND ATTORNEY’S FEES. The party who prevails in an arbitration, civil action, or other proceeding to enforce or interpret the Governing Documents shall be entitled to recover all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney’s fees, but the arbitrator, judge or other decision maker shall have final discretion to allocate such costs and expenses between the parties in a manner that will accomplish substantial justice.”

In September 2019, both sides filed motions for attorney fees based on Civil Code section 5975, arguing that it was the prevailing party. Dr. Artus also sought attorney fees based on Civil Code section 5145, subdivision (b) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (section 1021.5), the private attorney general doctrine.

Both sides sought over $300,000 in attorney fees, in pleadings and documents that can only be described as voluminous: from September 2 through October 18, the motions, memoranda, declarations, and exhibits in support of and opposition to the motions totaled 1867 pages!

The motions first came on for hearing on October 8, 2019, prior to which Judge Kahn had issued a tentative ruling denying attorney fees to both sides. Both sides contested, and a lengthy hearing ensued, in the course of which it was determined that the parties would prepare charts setting forth their respective positions, with the motions to be set for further hearing.

Both sides filed their charts and their further positions based on those charts, adding an additional 217 pages of material filed between May 19 and June 5, 2020. So, over 2000 pages of material had been presented to Judge Kahn when the motions came on for hearing on June 5, a lengthy hearing that generated a reporter’s transcript of 58 pages. And one reading that transcript—with Judge Kahn’s questions, his comments, and his colloquy with counsel—cannot but be impressed by the depth and breadth of Judge Kahn’s understanding of the litigation.

On September 2, Judge Kahn issued a 20-page order denying fees to both sides, with an analysis that will be discussed in more detail below in connection with the particular issue to which it pertains. Suffice to say here that Judge Kahn concluded that Dr. Artus had four main litigation objectives and that she “achieved only one of her four main litigation objectives,” limited to a procedural victory under the second objective when GTCA “changed its ways of providing notice of proposed rules changes” in amending its election rules. And even as to this, he added that Dr. Artus did not obtain any substantive victory on this second objective, and it was “the least consequential for her since, while it requires GTCA to provide better paperwork when it proposes changes to its rules, Dr. Artus’[s] success on her second main litigation objective does not significantly constrain GTCA’s ability to change its rules or what it includes in its rules.”

*3 Judge Kahn also denied Dr. Artus’s request for fees under section 1021.5, concluding that she did not meet the “successful party” standard under that section. He further found that Dr. Artus failed to show that her lawsuit resulted in “significant benefit” to the “general public or large classes of persons.”

As to GTCA’s claim for fees, Judge Kahn “reject[ed] GTCA’s argument that it prevailed in this lawsuit because it remained free of court restrictions to change its rules.” As he saw it, GTCA’s main litigation objective “was to reduce, and hopefully end, the wasteful use of its resources in fighting Dr. Artus, particularly litigation expenses and the time of its volunteers and employees.” Given the possibility of another lawsuit over the rules amended by GTCA and “over the vehement and repeated objections of Dr. Artus [GTCA has not] reduced, much less eliminated, the governance disputes between GTCA and Dr. Artus and their attendant costs and staff and volunteer time.” Finally, Judge Kahn added, “it would be strange indeed for a defendant, as a result of his own unilateral conduct taken without a court order or other indicia of court approval, to be considered a litigation winner. If this were the case, surely defendants would frequently take such unilateral actions, declare victory, and ask for fees.”

On October 22, Dr. Artus filed her appeal, and on October 30, GTCA its cross-appeal.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Artus’s Appeal

Dr. Artus asserts two fundamental arguments on appeal, that: (1) Judge Kahn erred in finding she was not a prevailing party, and (2) she was entitled to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.1 Both arguments are based on a claimed standard of review that is wrong, and we thus begin with the standard of review.

The Standard of Review

Dr. Artus asserts that the standard of review is de novo, on the claimed basis that “entitlement to attorney fees under [ Civil Code section] 1354, subdivision (f) is a question of law.”2 The two cases she cites— Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1158, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 and Salawy v. Ocean Towers Housing Corp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 664, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 427—are not relevant.

[1] [2] [3]The relevant cases hold that the standard of review is abuse of discretion. Rancho Santa Fe Assn. v. Dolan-King (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 28, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 614 ( Rancho Santa Fe) is illustrative, a case involving the predecessor to the very statute involved here: “Ordinarily, an award of attorney fees under a statutory provision, such as [Civil Code] section 1354, subdivision (f), is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” ( Rancho Santa Fe, at p. 46, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 614.) As an earlier case put it, a court’s ruling on who is the prevailing party “should be affirmed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” ( Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1574, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 ( Heather Farms).) As we ourselves have put it, “the trial ‘ “ ‘court is given wide discretion in determining which party has prevailed ….’ ” [Citation.]’ ” ( Sears v. Baccaglio (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1158, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 769.)

*4 The same standard of review applies to Civil Code section 5145. ( Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 260, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 233 [suggesting that the prevailing party inquiry is the same for all Davis-Sterling Act fee provisions]; see generally Artus I, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 944, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 496.) And also for fee orders in section 1021.5 cases. ( Karuk Tribe of Northern California v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., North Coast Region (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 330, 363, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40 ( Karuk) [“ ‘ “normal standard of review is abuse of discretion” ’ ”].)

Not only do the cases demonstrate the discretionary nature of the trial court’s analysis, but other principles also come into play in a court’s discretion, two of which were in fact quoted by Judge Kahn in his order here:

(1) “ ‘The analysis of who is a prevailing party under the fee-shifting provisions of the [Davis-Sterling] Act focuses on who prevailed “on a practical level” by achieving its main litigation objectives.’ ( Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association v. Hazelbaker, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 260, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 233 quoting Heather Farms, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th 1568, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 758)”; and

(2) “ ‘[T]he test for prevailing party is a pragmatic one, namely whether a party prevailed on a practical level by achieving its main litigation objectives.’ ( Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Association v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 773, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 268.)”

And on top of all that is the observation by our Supreme Court, that “in determining litigation success, courts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by ‘equitable considerations.’ ” ( Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804.) In short, abuse of discretion it is—along with practicality and equity.

Dr. Artus has not shown any impracticality in Judge Kahn’s ruling. Nor any inequity. And most fundamentally, she has shown no abuse of discretion. As to what such showing requires, it has been described in terms of a decision that “exceeds the bounds of reason” ( People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920, 55 Cal.Rptr.3d 865, 153 P.3d 955), or one that is arbitrary, capricious, patently absurd, or even whimsical. (See, e.g., People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 390, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 185, 334 P.3d 573 [“ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd” ’ ”]; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 88, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099 [ruling “ ‘ “falls ‘outside the bounds of reason’ ” ’ ”]; People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1614, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 868 [“arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious”].) In its most recent observation on the subject, our Supreme Court said that “A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” ( Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 614, 288 P.3d 1237 ( Sargon).) Those adjectives hardly describe Judge Kahn’s ruling here.

Dr. Artus Has Not Demonstrated an Abuse of Discretion

[4]Dr. Artus’s first argument, that Judge Kahn erred in not finding her a prevailing party, asserts she “prevailed” in three particulars: (a) “on her election-rule challenge to force the Association to adhere to Civil Code [section] 4360 ’s rule-making procedure”; (b) “on causing major substantive revisions to the election rules”; and (c) “on her challenge to the sales and leasing guidelines by forcing the Association to adhere to proper rule making procedures.” She also argues that, even if she did not achieve all her objectives, a victory as to election rules requires attorney fees award under the Davis-Sterling Act.

*5 Passing over the fact that Dr. Artus’s brief misrepresents the record in many respects, her arguments fall way short, as they do little, if anything, more than regurgitate and reassert the same arguments thoroughly analyzed—and rejected—by Judge Kahn in his analysis.

As indicated above, Judge Kahn determined that Dr. Artus had four main objectives in her lawsuit, which he described as follows, giving appropriate record references:

“(1) To obtain redress for ‘both current substantive and historical violations’ of the [Davis-Sterling Act] by GTCA and its ‘systematic and habitual mismanagement’ by the appointment of a ‘monitor’ to ensure that GTCA is in full compliance with its obligations under the [Davis-Sterling Act] and its governing documents. (Dr. Artus’[s] memorandum in opposition to GTCA’s anti-SLAPP motion filed February 15, 2018 pp. 9-10 (referring to this objective as the ‘gravamen’ of the complaint); see also the first cause of action in Dr. Artus’[s] first amended complaint and Dr. Artus’[s] application for approval of complex designation filed October 10, 2017 pp. 2-3 (explaining that this objective makes this case suitable for complex treatment)).

“(2) To enjoin the enforcement of the 2016 election rules. (Dr. Artus’[s] application and supporting papers for an order to show cause for why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the ‘restated election and voting rules’ filed December 26, 2017; see also the second and fourth causes of action in Dr. Artus’[s] first amended complaint).

“(3) For a determination that GTCA is required to use the 2007 election rules as amended in 2014 unless Dr. Artus consents and the court permits because those rules were enshrined in the 2013 settlement agreement and the 2014 stipulated order. (Deposition of Dr. Artus taken on August 22, 2018 pp. 63 and 65; Dr. Artus’[s] August 2, 2018 email to Ms. Bires section (2); Dr. Artus’[s] September 4, 2018 email to Ms. Bires pp 5-7; Dr. Artus’[s] first amended complaint pars. 48 and 56-57).

“(4) For a determination that GTCA may not impose any restrictions on members and their real estate agents that Dr. Artus believes ‘unreasonably interfere [with] alienation rights, including but not limited to limitations on advertising, limitations on the use of the “Gramercy Towers” name and address on listing and photos of the building for marketing purposes.’ (Dr. Artus’[s] August 2, 2018 email to Ms. Bires section (7); see also the third cause of action in Dr. Artus’[s] first amended complaint and Dr. Artus’[s] September 4, 2018 email to Ms. Bires pp. 7-11 (‘I can see no reason why GTCA can be allowed to seek information regarding real estate agents its members retain’)).”

Having defined the four main litigation objectives, Judge Kahn then went on to analyze them, one-by-one, to conclude that Dr. Artus had prevailed in only one, holding as follows:

“Dr. Artus achieved only one of her four main litigation objectives. If on a practical level that one objective was equal to or greater than the other three, [Davis-Sterling Act] fees case law might support an award of fees to Dr. Artus. In my estimation, however, Dr. Artus’[s] procedural win on her second main litigation objective is nowhere close in value to the wins she failed to achieve on her first, third and fourth main litigation objectives. Indeed, of her four main litigation objectives, the second one is the least consequential for her since, while it requires GTCA to provide better paperwork when it proposes to change its rules, Dr. Artus’[s] success on her second main litigation objective does not significantly constrain GTCA’s ability to change its rules or what it includes in its rules. Accordingly, per the above pragmatic analysis of Dr. Artus’[s] main litigation objectives, I find that Dr. Artus is not entitled to an award of fees per either [Civil Code section] 5145[, subdivision] (b) or [Civil Code section] 5975[, subdivision] (c) because she only achieved a very modest portion of her main litigation objectives. (Accord Declaration of Plaintiff Kazuko K. Artus, Ph.D., J.D., in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees filed September 12, 2019, par. 54 (Dr. Artus acknowledged that she has ‘yet to accomplish my objective of having [Gramercy] comply with rules regulating it’)).”

*6 Dr. Artus’s arguments, however lengthy they be, demonstrate nothing to the contrary. Dr. Artus’s opening brief is 44 pages long, with the arguments quoted above, arguments that fundamentally make three points: (1) she achieved her primary litigation objective when GTCA amended its election rules and guidelines effectively revoking the prior versions; (2) GTCA mooted the case once she achieved her objectives; and (3) the preliminary injunction order supports her position that she prevailed. None of these arguments is persuasive—not to mention all were rejected by Judge Kahn.

Contrary to her argument that she obtained her primary litigation objective when GTCA properly adopted new election rules by informing the “purpose and effect” of those rules, the record shows that her primary objective was to compel GTCA to use only the election procedures. Dr. Artus alleged that she sought to require “GTCA to follow the Election Procedures” and to conduct elections and all other related activities under the Election Procedures; her testimony was similar: that GTCA should be only using the election procedures and “no other election rules.”

As to Dr. Artus’s claim of mootness, that she “had no choice but to agree with GTCA’s position” on mootness, Judge Kahn concluded otherwise: “Dr. Artus could have stood her ground and continued to litigate. The 2018 rules and guidelines included several provisions from the prior rules and guidelines that Dr. Artus contended were invalid in the first amended complaint. As but two examples, the 2018 election rules did not place any limits on inspector compensation and the 2018 sales and leasing guidelines contained significant restrictions on advertising members’ units. Dr. Artus’[s] claims regarding those provisions did not become moot merely because those provisions were now included in new sets of rules and guidelines. Nor, as discussed previously, did her claim—one of her main litigation objectives—that GTCA lacked authority to adopt any election rules other than the 2007/2014 rules without her consent and permission of the court become moot merely because GTCA adopted yet another set of election rules at variance from the 2007/2014 rules she contended that ‘GTCA cannot touch.’ (Dr. Artus’[s] May 21, 2018 email to John Zappettini.”

And Dr. Artus’s reliance on the preliminary injunction is not only unavailing, it is premised on a gross overstatement of the record. That is, Dr. Artus’s brief asserts that the preliminary injunction enjoined “GTCA from using the alternative election rules during the pendency of this lawsuit.” In fact, Judge Kahn’s preliminary injunction was limited to the one election, in early 2018, and four procedural requirements on that election under the Election Procedures: (1) the appointment of three inspectors; (2) those inspectors would appoint and oversee ballot counters; (3) abide by the communications provision of the Election Procedures; (4) and abide by the ballot retention procedures of the Election Procedures.

Dr. Artus’s attempted recharacterization of the preliminary injunction order was in fact contradicted by Judge Kahn’s order which stated: “Yet it must be kept in mind that the preliminary injunction order was a preliminary, not a final, order and only applied to a single election. As Dr. Artus knows from the 2014 lawsuit she filed against GTCA, a later trial can eviscerate an earlier preliminary injunction victory and deprive her of the ability to receive fees.”

Dr. Artus Has Not Demonstrated the Right to Attorney Fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5

*7 [5]As noted, Dr. Artus also sought attorney fees based on section 1021.5. Judge Kahn rejected it, concluding that Dr. Artus was not a “successful party” under that section, and for the “further reason [that she] failed to show, as required for a [section] 1021.5 fees award, that this lawsuit resulted in a ‘significant benefit’ to the ‘general public or a large class of persons.’ ” As he went on to explain, “Her one real win—which requires GTCA to incur greater effort in preparing its notice materials for proposed rules changes—is of questionable significance to the vast majority of GTCA members and will likely result in higher assessments to GTCA members to pay for the increased costs to ‘dot every i and cross every t’ in the notice materials to avoid disputes from Dr. Artus. Indeed, crediting the declarations of GTCA’s staff and volunteers it appears that few of the governance disputes raised by Dr. Artus are of concern to other GTCA members. Dr. Artus has made no contrary showing.”

Dr. Artus’s argument that she is “entitled” to attorney fees under section 1021.5, has six subparts: (1) she “obtained some benefit on a significant issue in the litigation”; (2) “interim and partial success is sufficient under [section] 1021.5”; (3) Judge Kahn “did not apply the correct test”; (4) the ruling “that the action did not confer a significant benefit on the general public, or a large class of persons was incorrect as a matter of law”; (5) “necessity and financial burden of private enforcement make [an] award appropriate”; and (6) “there was no monetary recovery.” The argument is not persuasive.

Section 1021.5 provides in pertinent part: “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement or enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any….”

In Karuk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 330, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40, we discussed at length section 1021.5 and its operation, included within which was this explanation how an award made pursuant to this statute is reviewed:

[6] [7] [8]“ ‘ “The Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of the private attorney general doctrine of attorney fees developed in prior judicial decisions…. [T]he private attorney general doctrine ‘rests upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.’ Thus, the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.” [Citation.]’ ” ( Karuk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 362, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40.)

[9] [10] [11]“Put another way, courts check to see whether the lawsuit initiated by the plaintiff was ‘demonstrably influential’ in overturning, remedying, or prompting a change in the state of affairs challenged by the lawsuit. (E.g., Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 687, 186 Cal.Rptr. 589, 652 P.2d 437; RiverWatch v. County of San Diego Dept. of Environmental Health (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 768, 783, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 362; Lyons v. Chinese Hospital Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1346, fn. 9, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 550.) ‘ “Entitlement to fees under [section] 1021.5 is based on the impact of the case as a whole.” ’ ( Punsly v. Ho (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 102, 114, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, quoting what is now Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2008) § 4.11, p. 100.) As for what constitutes a ‘significant benefit,’ it ‘may be conceptual or doctrinal, and need not be actual and concrete, so long as the public is primarily benefited.’ ( Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 162, 171, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 510.)

*8 “Thus, a trial court which grants an application for attorney fees under section 1021.5 has made a practical and realistic assessment of the litigation and determined that (1) the applicant was a successful party, (2) in an action that resulted in (a) enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest and (b) a significant benefit to the general public or a large class of persons, and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement of the important right make an award of fees appropriate.

[12] [13]“ ‘ “On review of an award of attorney fees … the normal standard of review is abuse of discretion. However, de novo review of such a trial court order is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for an award of attorney fees … have been satisfied amounts to statutory construction and a question of law.” ’ ( Connerly v. State Personnel Bd. (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, 1175, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 788, 129 P.3d 1, quoting Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 132, 142, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 569.)” ( Karuk, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 363, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40.)

Applying those rules, we went on in Karuk to reverse an award of $138,000 in attorney fees, concluding that three of the statutory requisites to an award under section 1021.5 were absent. ( Karuk, at p. 364, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 40.) Likewise here.

It is perhaps enough to note that Dr. Artus does not specifically address the threshold requisite of demonstrating she was a “successful party.” Nor does she demonstrate any significant benefit to the general public or a large class of persons.

Bowman v. City of Berkeley (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 173, 175-176, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 447 ( Bowman), cited by Dr. Artus in claimed support of her argument she achieved a significant benefit, is not to the contrary. The facts there included a petition by a group of owners to overturn the city’s approval of a housing project for seniors, which succeeded in overturning the initial approval. The project was ultimately re-approved and the trial court denied the remainder of the groups’ claims. ( Id. at p. 177, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 447.) The trial court thereafter granted attorney’s fees in connection with the due process achievement. Division Four of this court affirmed. Doing so, the court noted the redo of the approval by the city, in light of plaintiffs’ petition, “resulted in a great deal of additional public input on the project, including substantial new written submissions, and oral statements to the city council, from city staff as well as proponents and opponents of the project”; and the trial court determined “ ‘both parties used the opportunity to supplement the administrative record to provide additional evidence intended to sway findings made by the council members.’ ” ( Id. at p. 180, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 447.) The setting here is a far cry.

Here, only Dr. Artus filed suit to challenge GTCA’s governance. She did not show that other members objected to GTCA’s ways or its rules. And she did not achieve any significant benefit to other members when GTCA undertook to amend its election rules and sales guidelines, let alone benefit to the public.

Likewise unavailing is La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn. of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1149, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 338 ( La Mirada), where plaintiffs filed writ petitions to invalidate variances granted by the city in approving a Target retail store and obtained a judgment “invalidating six of the eight municipal code variances, enjoining any actions ‘in furtherance of’ those variances, and ‘immediately … restrain[ing] … all construction activities’ [and] also authorized plaintiffs to seek attorney’s fees.” Both parties appealed, and during the appeal, per Target’s urging, the city amended its zoning which mooted the appeal. ( Id. at p. 1154, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 338.) The court dismissed the appeals as moot but left the judgment intact and ultimately awarded plaintiff attorneys fees. ( Id. at p. 1155, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 338.) The significant benefit was an order requiring the city to comply with the legal requirements to grant the variance. ( Id. at pp. 1158-1159, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 338.)

*9 Unlike in La Mirada, Dr. Artus did not obtain a judgment invalidating any of GTCA’s governance that she challenged; the mootness of this action was not found by Judge Kahn but by Dr. Artus’s stipulation; and GTCA did not take any action to change its rules because of Dr. Artus’s urgings.

Dr. Artus argues that partial or interim success is enough for an award of attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5, citing to Bowman, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 178, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 447 and La Mirada, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1160, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 338. To the contrary, as Dr. Artus herself knows, she has already failed on a similar argument in Artus I, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 927, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 496, where Division One noted the “well-established principles that fees and costs are ordinarily not granted for interim success, and that the prevailing party is determined, and fees and costs awarded, at the conclusion of the litigation.”

As indicated, Dr. Artus makes two other arguments, numbered six and seven: (6) “Trial court abused its discretion in denying fees to [Dr. Artus] because she stopped litigating after the controversy was mooted by GTCA,” and (7) “The Court of Appeal should reconsider or reformulate the interim attorney’s fees rules as it applies to associations that moot controversies.” Neither argument merits discussion. The third argument, all of five lines, has no support. And the fourth argument essentially asks us to change some language in the earlier opinion by our colleagues in Division One. It is most inappropriate.

DISCUSSION: GTCA’s Appeal

GTCA Has Not Shown an Abuse of Discretion

[14]Cross-appealing Judge Kahn’s denial of attorney fees to it, GTCA has filed a 22-page opening brief that has an introduction, a statement of facts and procedural history, and fewer than 12 pages described as “discussion,” fewer than two pages of which could even be considered argument.

The discussion begins with this assertion: “GTCA’s issue on appeal is the trial court erred in ruling that its litigation objective was to reduce its resources and end the fighting with Dr. Artus; rather, GTCA’s litigation objective was to prevent Dr. Artus from dictating how GTCA should operate and what rules it should adopt. To that end, it prevailed and should be awarded attorneys’ fees per Civil Code section 5975, subdivision (c) and its Declaration.”

And what might be called the argument that follows consists of these three brief paragraphs:

“The trial court’s basis for determining GTCA’s litigation objective drew from ‘GTCA’s memorandum in support of its anti-SLAPP motion to strike filed January 16, 2018’ and declarations in support. The trial court found these declarations ‘replete with extremely high costs that GTCA has incurred in both its in-court and out-of-court disputes with Dr. Artus.’ The arguments and declarations from the anti-SLAPP motion on the use of GTCA’s resources and costs fighting Dr. Artus’[s] continuing disputes with the board were made in the context of the Association’s argument that the matter was of public interest to the community to warrant protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. See Civ[il] Code [section] 425.16. Anti-SLAPP public interest arguments do not equate to GTCA’s primary goal in this litigation was merely to reduce the use of the community’s resources to fight Dr. Artus. If that was the goal, GTCA would have capitulated early in the litigation without any strategic motion practice on a demurrer, anti-SLAPP motion, discovery, or summary judgment motion; or GTCA would have sought early settlement.

*10 “Instead, GTCA’s stance and objective throughout the litigation was to not give into Dr. Artus’[s] demands or desires for GTCA to be governed by her terms and her rules, and for Dr. Artus to not obtain any relief on her claims that GTCA was operating improperly. As stated by GTCA’s president: ‘It has been the Board’s objective in this litigation to not allow a single owner to dictate how the Board should function or bully its decision-making.’

“Thus, even under an abuse of discretion standard, the trial court’s determination of GTCA’s litigation objective and that it did not prevail on that objective cannot stand.”

That is essentially it. It is unpersuasive, as it utterly fails to come to grips with Judge Kahn’s detailed analysis, which includes the following: “Because this lawsuit ended as a result of GTCA’s unilateral decision to adopt revised election rules and sales and leasing guidelines, which GTCA could have done at any point in the lawsuit and for which it needed no order or approval from the court, on a pragmatic and practical level GTCA did not achieve its litigation objectives. It would be strange indeed for a defendant, as a result of its own unilateral conduct taken without a court order or other indicia of court approval, to be considered a litigation winner. If this were the case, surely defendants would frequently take such unilateral actions, declare victory, and ask for fees. In my almost 40 years as a civil litigator and a judge handling civil cases, I have never seen anyone do this before. And, despite my extensive efforts to find such a case, I could not locate any published California decision which holds or suggests that a defendant can be a prevailing party for purposes of a fees award as a result of its own unilateral actions that moot the plaintiff’s claims. I therefore reject GTCA’s argument that it prevailed in this lawsuit because it remained free of court restrictions to change its rules. Cutting to the chase, the fatal defect in GTCA’s argument is that it remains free of court restrictions because it took unilateral action to avoid rulings on court restrictions and, in doing so, simply ‘kicked the can down the road’ as to whether a court would place restrictions on its rule changes.

“The three cases cited by GTCA to support its position that it prevailed in this lawsuit are readily distinguishable. In Almanor [Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 268] the determination that a homeowners’ association was the prevailing party came after a trial where the parties fully litigated the claims and cross-claims of both parties. In Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners’ Association (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 886 the court held that the defendant homeowners’ association was a prevailing party because the plaintiff dismissed his claims on the eve of trial due to the unavailability of a witness without seeking a continuance. In Villa De La Palmas Homeowners Association [v. Terifaj] (2004) 33 Cal.4th 73, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 67, 90 P.3d 1223 a plaintiff homeowners’ association was the prevailing party because it obtained an injunction which achieved its main litigation objective. Unlike this lawsuit, in none of the cases relied on by GTCA did the prevailing party association take any action outside the lawsuit, unilateral or otherwise, that precipitated dismissal of its member’s claims based on mootness or any similar ground.[3]

*11 “In all events, viewed on a pragmatic and practical level GTCA’s main litigation objective in this lawsuit, as it appears to have been in most or all of its dealings with Dr. Artus on governance issues, was to reduce, and hopefully end, the wasteful use of its resources in fighting Dr. Artus, particularly litigation expenses and the time of its volunteers and employees. (See GTCA’s memorandum in support of its anti-SLAPP motion to strike filed January 16, 2018 p. 4 (in two years GTCA received over 400 emails from Dr. Artus with complaints about GTCA’s governance. ‘Nine out of ten complaints the Association [GTCA] receives from its members are from [Dr. Artus]…. Considerable time and community resources are expended to ensure each of [Dr. Atrus’s] requests are addressed out of fear that any issue, no matter how trivial, may result in litigation.’)) The declarations of GTCA’s representatives are replete with the extremely high costs that GTCA has incurred in both its in-court and out-of-court disputes with Dr. Artus. As the August and September 2018 emails by Dr. Artus to Ms. Bires and the many declarations of Dr. Artus filed in this lawsuit reveal, neither this lawsuit nor GTCA’s unilateral adoption of revised election rules and sales and leasing guidelines in 2018 over the vehement and repeated objections of Dr. Artus has reduced, much less eliminated, the governance disputes between GTCA and Dr. Artus and their attendant costs and staff and volunteer time. In this lawsuit, GTCA turned tail, instead of addressing Dr. Artus’[s] claims on the merits. It should not be rewarded for doing so by an award of fees.”

We end our opinion quoting the concern, the counsel, of Judge Kahn: “Sad to say, unless the past is a poor predictor of the future or the parties are no longer able or willing to devote the huge resources they have devoted previously, it is likely that there will be a fifth Artus v. GTCA lawsuit. This fourth lawsuit, especially the way it concluded, accomplished little or nothing to prevent that from occurring. In that regard, I conclude this order by repeating a statement I made almost three years ago at the final hearing in the third Artus v. GTCA lawsuit: ‘I’m aware that there has been a long history of disputes between Dr. Artus and this association, I’m trying to send a message here. And that message is, don’t run to court. Run to try to work things out. Both sides.” To that we say “Amen.”

DISPOSITION

The order denying attorney fees is affirmed. Each side shall bear its own costs.

We concur:
Stewart, J.
Mayfield, J.*

Footnotes

* Superior Court of Mendocino County, Judge Cindee Mayfield, sitting as assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

1 As briefly noted below, Dr. Artus also makes two other arguments, one of which has no support, the other of which requires little discussion.

2 We note that Dr. Artus mentions only Civil Code 1354, subdivision (f) in her argument for a de novo standard of review and fails to mention any other statute under which she sought fees. We also find quizzical her reference to “ section 1354,” as effective January 1, 2014, as part of the renumbering and reorganization of the Davis-Sterling Act, Civil Code section 1354 was renumbered as 5975.

3 Salehi and Almanor are the two cases GTCA relies on here.

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